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countries and regions—particularly the
United States—still exhibit a home bias
in their portfolio choices, the rapid
expansion of gross external assets and
liabilities together with other statistical
measures clearly suggests a trend toward
greater international diversification.
Associated with this financial globaliza-
tion has been a substantial net flow of
foreign savings into the United States,
although not to such an extent that for-
eign portfolios seem burdened with too
many U.S. equities and bonds. 
Even allowing that the size and breadth of
our financial markets protects the United
States from foreign financial shocks, the
increased globalization of financial 
markets suggests that investment returns
in the United States should be more 
sensitive to global developments than in
the past. If so, then global saving and
investment patterns may help explain why
real long-term U.S. interest rates seem
low given the removal of policy accom-
modation, our growing net external liabil-
ities, and the current state of the U.S.
business cycle—a phenomenon dubbed
the interest rate “conundrum.” 
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One way to think about monetary
policy is in terms of a neutral federal
funds rate, one that exerts neither
inflationary nor deflationary pres-
sures. Recent declines in worldwide
investment, coupled with the growing
globalization of financial markets
suggest that the neutral rate may be
lower than the current stance of mon-
etary policy and the stage of the busi-
ness cycle may lead one to believe.
Since June of 2004, the FOMC has
increased the federal funds target rate
from 1 percent to 4.25 percent in an
effort to remove policy accommodation.
Policymakers look to establish a target
rate that will promote long-term eco-
nomic growth without generating 
inflation. 
Many economists conceptualize the
FOMC’s actions in terms of a neutral
federal funds target rate. In this frame-
work, a funds rate below its neutral level
eventually creates inflation. A funds rate
above the neutral level suppresses 
inflationary pressures, but at the risk 
of inducing subpar economic growth.
Policymakers must continually assess
where the current federal funds rate is
relative to its neutral value. Unfortu-
nately, the neutral federal funds rate is
not a constant, and economists’esti-
mates of it have been notoriously impre-
cise. Moreover, the neutral rate is not a
“closed-economy” phenomenon; inter-
national developments affect it. 
Drawing on two recent International
Monetary Fund (IMF) studies, this 
Economic Commentary explains how
international developments—chiefly, 
the lackluster performance of worldwide
investment and the growing globaliza-
tion of international financial markets—
help explain the recent unusual behavior
of U.S. long-term interest rates and sug-
gest that the neutral federal funds target
rate may be lower than many believe. 
■ The Neutral Rate of Interest
The neutral rate of interest is a real (or
inflation-adjusted) rate that equates real
savings with real investment in a fully
employed, competitive, and frictionless
economy; that is, an economy persis-
tently growing at its full potential. It is a
theoretical construct, and as such, it is
unobservable and difficult to estimate. 
The day-to-day economy, of course, 
contains many frictions: Prices are often
set by contract or custom, which slows
their response to changing economic
conditions. Information typically is
costly to acquire and often takes time to
disseminate, and just the act of adapting
to economic change involves resource
costs that slow the process. As a conse-
quence of these types of frictions, infla-
tion-adjusted market rates can diverge
from their neutral levels following any
kind of economic shock, like an unantici-
pated change in monetary policy, a major
oil price hike, or devastating hurricanes. 
The neutral real interest rate is also not
constant; it changes in response to any-
thing that affects long-term real saving
and investment patterns. Such things as
an aging population, persistent budget
deficits, or technological change will
raise or lower the neutral real interest
rate. Some changes emanate from
beyond our borders, making the neutral
federal funds rate an open-economy con-
cept. In a world where obstacles to the
globalization of financial markets are
rapidly disappearing, events that affect
foreign saving and investment choices
can also raise or lower the neutral real
rate of interest in the United States. 
■ Financial Globalization
Over the past 15 years, the world has
witnessed a marked increase in the glob-
alization of financial markets. According
to IMF estimates, gross external assets
and liabilities of industrialized coun-
tries—and to a lesser extent emerging-
market economies—quadrupled during
the 1990s to 200 percent of GDP by
2003. While private investors in most■ Global Investment
In a closely connected world, if one
nation hiccups the rest will feel it, and
according to the IMF, the world has
lately been hiccupping. Global invest-
ment fell from approximately 23 per-
cent of world GDP in 1997 to roughly
21 percent in 2002 and, according to 
the latest available data, has since
recovered to approximately 22 percent
in 2004 (see figure 1). While the net
change in this ratio may not seem large,
estimates suggest that the current pace
of worldwide economic recovery and
the recent decline in the cost of capital
are capable of supporting a higher level
of global investment than we have
recently seen. Most of the investment
decline among industrialized countries
has been concentrated in Japan and in
the euro area. Investment in other
industrialized countries remained flat 
as a percent of GDP on balance
between 2001 and 2004. In the United
States, fixed investment has advanced
as a share of GDP since early in 2003,
but remains below its past peak.  
The recent investment pattern among
emerging-market economies is not much
different than that of the industrialized
countries (figure 2). Investment in most
East Asian countries fell precipitously in
the mid-1990s following the Asian finan-
cial crisis and has not yet rebounded.
China, however, is a notable exception.
Investment there has risen sharply.
Among the oil-producing nations and
other emerging-market nations, invest-
ment has been lackluster.  
In the aggregate, saving must equal
investment, and so global saving has also
fallen as a share of world GDP. That real
long-term interest rates have declined
along with the drop in saving and 
investment suggests that the underlying
“shock” to financial markets emanated
from the investment side (figure 3). As
noted above, historical experience 
suggests that the recent pace of output
growth and the decline in the cost of 
capital could support a higher investment
demand. In its analysis, the IMF attrib-
utes a large portion of the drop in invest-
ment (and saving) among industrialized
countries to common global factors
related to productivity and asset prices.
Higher, more variable oil prices could be
a key factor. In addition, declines in the
relative price of capital goods—notably
computers and information technology—
may account for part of the drop in
investment relative to GDP, even while
promoting a higher level of real invest-
ment. Common global factors seem less




Although saving and investment must be
equal in the aggregate, saving within any
country or region can—and typically
does—differ from local investment.
Divergences between domestic saving
and investment patterns are mirrored in
nations’current-account positions. 
Countries running current-account sur-
pluses save more than they invest, while
countries experiencing current-account
deficits invest more than they save. In
most foreign countries and regions since
1997, saving has generally paralleled
investment, but has exceeded it some-
what. Consequently, most countries and
regions maintain small current-account
surpluses. 
There are, however, some notable
exceptions. As a consequence of a low
private savings rate and expanding fed-
eral budget deficits, overall saving in the
United States has fallen sharply since
1997 and has remained well below
investment (figure 4). In contrast, most
East Asian countries and oil-producing
countries maintain saving substantially
in excess of local investment (figure 2).
These countries have been increasing
their public-sector saving, building
reserves as a buffer against potential
future financial crises. Corporate saving
in emerging-market countries has also
risen over the current business upturn
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SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook.according to the IMF, but corporate 
saving has generally gone to improve
balance sheets rather than to finance
real investment. 
According to the IMF, the inflow of
savings from emerging-market and 
oil-producing countries has financed
approximately two-thirds of the diver-
gence between U.S. investment and
saving. Although foreign savings are
accommodating a larger U.S. current-
account deficit, expanding domestic
aggregate demand seems the leading
causal factor. If a “glut” of foreign 
savings was the dominant causal factor
behind the growing current-account
deficit, as was the case from mid-1995
through 2001, the dollar would have
appreciated in real terms as the U.S.
current-account deficit expanded. 
Since early 2002, however, the dollar
has depreciated as the current-account
deficit increased—a pattern that is 
consistent with expanding domestic
aggregate demand and accommodating
inflows of foreign savings. 
In any event, because foreign savings
from East Asian and oil-producing
countries have poured into dollar assets,
the real dollar depreciation has been
smaller than many people previously
expected it to be, given the size of 
the current-account deficit and our 
outstanding dollar-denominated liabili-
ties. We have not experienced the peren-
nially predicted “hard landing.” Simi-
larly, real interest rates in this country
have not increased as much as people
previously anticipated given our external
position and the stage of the business
cycle. Weak empirical evidence, which
the IMF offers, suggests that industrial-
ized countries with large net external 
liabilities tend to experience higher real
interest rates than those with net external
assets. As financial globalization has 
progressed, however, this relationship
has virtually vanished, implying that
countries with large net external liabili-
ties are finding it easier to finance their
positions without changes in real interest
rates or exchange rates. 
■ The Neutral Rate
In an era of growing financial globaliza-
tion, the lackluster performance of for-
eign investment has channeled foreign
savings into the United States, keeping
interest rates lower than they otherwise
might be given the stance of monetary
policy and the stage of the business
cycle. As a consequence, the neutral 
federal funds rate target may be lower
than many economists expect. As finan-
cial globalization proceeds, achieving
domestic policy objectives—a low infla-
tion rate and sustained growth at poten-
tial—may require increased attention to
FIGURE 4 SAVING AND INVESTMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES














































global developments. Continued recov-
ery abroad, for example, would open up
more investment opportunities outside
the United States and could eventually
put stronger upward pressures on
domestic interest rates and downward
pressure on dollar exchange rates than
has heretofore been the case. As world
markets become more closely inte-
grated, the neutral rate will become even
more of a global phenomenon. 
■ Recommended Reading
My information on the globalization of
financial market and global saving and
investment patterns came from two
excellent IMF survey articles, each of
which contains an extensive bibliogra-
phy of the relevant literature: 
International Monetary Fund. 2005.
“Globalization and External Imbal-
ances,” World Economic Outlook 
(April), pp. 109–56. 
International Monetary Fund. 2005.
“Global Imbalances: A Savings and
Investment Perspective,” World 
Economic Outlook (September), 
pp. 91–124.
a.Calculated using 12-month change in the CPI.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.
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